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I. Introduction
During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, members of the Hutu ethnic group committed widespread sexual violence, including rape, mutilation, and collective and individual sexual slavery, against Tutsi women. [FN1] The
role hate propaganda played in the incitement of genocide in general, and sexual violence against women in particular, is critical to understanding how ethnic tensions erupted into genocide. The Rwandan written press and
radio stations created a propaganda campaign that demonized the Tutsi population by playing upon historical
stereotypes and misconceptions first introduced*734 by Rwanda's colonizers. [FN2] As popular targets of propaganda, Tutsi women were portrayed as evil seductresses, transformed into “pistols” to conquer Rwanda. [FN3]
The propagandists' characterization of Tutsi women as beautiful, manipulative, highly sexual infiltrators dedicated to humiliating Hutu men and furthering Tutsi dominance was a catalyst for the mass sexual violence that
occurred during the 1994 genocide. The existence of such extensive hate propaganda targeting Tutsi women
supports the argument that the sexual violence was not a mere side effect of the conflict, but rather an integral
part of the genocidal campaign.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has decisively held that sexual violence may constitute genocide and crimes against humanity. [FN4] The tribunal, however, has not yet adequately addressed the
role that hate propaganda played in the incitement of sexual violence, nor the culpability under international law
of those responsible for the generation and dissemination of the propaganda. The ICTR has the opportunity to
address hate propaganda and the incitement of genocide with a proceeding that the tribunal has termed the Media Trial. In 1999 and 2000, the tribunal indicted three individuals, who controlled the media preceding and
throughout the genocide, for the roles they played in the genocidal violence. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and
Ferdinand Nahimana, founders of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), and Hassan Ngeze, owner
and editor of Kangura magazine, have been charged with conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity. [FN5] The ICTR is currently hearing their cases. *735 It is unclear, however, whether the ICTR will directly address “gender” hate
propaganda and its effect on the victimization of Tutsi women. [FN6]
This Note argues that Tutsi women were targeted by propagandists based on a dual animus--on the basis of
their ethnicity and their gender. As such, an “intersectional” legal analysis by the tribunal in the Media Trial
would provide a more effective and equitable result for the victims of sexual violence. [FN7] Furthermore, such
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an analysis would ensure that a focus on the broader context does not obscure Tutsi women's experiences. The
tribunal provides more than justice to the genocide's victims; it is also “charged with the mandate to render
justice and aid reconciliation in Rwanda, establishing the historical truth of what happened in Rwanda in 1994.”
[FN8] This truth should include both men's and women's experiences; the hate propaganda that targeted Tutsi
women, therefore, is a necessary component of the story. [FN9] Thus, the tribunal's judgments--beginning *736
with the Media Trial but not ending with it--must provide a clear picture of the ways in which the media contributed to the incitement of genocide through sexual violence.
Unfortunately, international law does not adequately address the intersection between gender and race, particularly with respect to incitement and hate speech. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention),
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention)
each provide protection against gender or race discrimination, or speech that incites genocide or other racial,
ethnic, or religious violence. No international instrument, however, adequately targets ethnic and gender-based
violence, gender-ethnic hate speech, and incitement of genocide. Nevertheless, the ICTR should directly assess
the role played by gender hate propaganda in the incitement of sexual violence. Ultimately, the international human rights legal precedent established by the ICTR in the Media Trial should take into consideration “the multiple identities of women across cultural, national, religious, ethnic, and racial barriers” [FN10] in determining
whether the media's incitement of sexual violence during the genocide constituted incitement and complicity to
commit genocide in violation of international human rights law.
In this Note, I will provide a brief background of the Rwandan genocide. Next, I will address the general
propaganda campaign, followed by the gender-specific propaganda campaign. I will then describe the sexual violence committed by members of the Hutu group against Tutsi women and proceed to an analysis of the effects
of such violence on Tutsi women's lives. Subsequently, I will provide an analysis of intersectional theory and its
application by various scholars. Next, I will address the lack of intersectionality in the ICTR's statute and international treaties. Finally, I will recommend an alternative framework for analyzing gender hate *737 propaganda's incitement of sexual violence and genocide, as well as how punishments may reflect an understanding of
this framework.
II. Background

A. Origins of the Genocide
To much of the general public in the international community, genocide in Rwanda appeared suddenly, with
a rapid and horrific surge in violence against the Tutsi minority in 1994. Genocide, however, is not a sudden
event; it is the result of complex factors fueled by history, psychology, and sociology, culminating in a quest for
power. In order to understand the sexual violence perpetrated throughout the 1994 genocide and the gender hate
propaganda that incited it, I will provide a brief background to the events of 1994.
When European colonizers [FN11] reached Rwanda, they encoun-tered a land inhabited by three groups: the
Tutsi, the Hutu, and the Twa. [FN12] These three groups were not distinguishable tribes with different cultures
and customs. Instead, they had “developed a single and highly sophisticated language, Kinyarwanda, crafted a
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common set of religious and philosophical beliefs, and created a culture which valued song, dance, poetry, and
rhetoric.” [FN13] Occupation and physical characteristics, however, differentiated the three groups. The Hutu,
comprising the vast majority of the population, were peasants with standard Bantu physical characteristics, resembling the Ugandan or Tanganyikan populations. [FN14] The Twa, comprising only approximately one percent of the population, were pygmoids and either hunter-gatherers or servants. [FN15] The Tutsi, cattle-herders
with particular phenotypes distinct from the Hutu and Twa, constituted the *738 remainder of the population.
[FN16] The Tutsi were extremely tall and thin with angular facial features. [FN17] The Europeans used these
phenotypic differences between the three groups to produce a theory of ethnic superiority: the Twa were at the
bottom, followed by the Hutu, with the Tutsi at the top of what constituted an ethnic hierarchy. [FN18]
The functional differentiation between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa was, in large part, a creation of colonialism.
[FN19] After gaining Rwanda from the Germans following World War I, the Belgian authorities systematized
indirect rule over Rwanda through Tutsis who had been educated at a missionary-run school. [FN20] This method of governance, combined with the Tutsi elite's recognition that supporting the ethnic hierarchy created by the
colonialists would benefit them, led to a “substantialization of Tutsi superiority” and its “institutionalization in
the colonial state apparatus.” [FN21] Shortly before Rwandan independence, however, the Belgian colonial administra-tion became fearful of the ascendance of the educated Tutsi elite and replaced Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs with Hutus. [FN22] Violent conflicts, largely along ethnic lines, resulted, compelling the United Nations
(U.N.) to intervene and oversee elections in 1961. [FN23]
*739 Unfortunately, the ethnic divisions instigated by Rwanda's colonizers had taken root. [FN24] By 1994,
power struggles and violent conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu had characterized much of Rwandan politics
since the country gained its independence in 1962. [FN25] A Hutu, President Juvenal Habyarimana, and his
Hutu-led party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), had been in power since
1973. [FN26] Pressures, however, from growing internal opposition and international donors, both pushing for a
more moderate government, as well threats of invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Uganda-based
group comprised largely of Tutsi refugees, threatened Habyarimana's monopoly on power. [FN27]
Events came to a head on April 6, 1994, when a plane carrying President Habyarimana was shot down in
Kigali, Rwanda. [FN28] Hutu extremists seized this opportunity to capitalize on the intense ethnic tensions and
conflict they had fueled through various means, including an anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign. [FN29] The following day, Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interahamwe [FN30]--militia groups--set *740 up roadblocks and
began a house-to-house search to find and murder Tutsi. [FN31] Between 500,000 and one million Rwandan
men, women, and children were slaughtered in the genocidal persecution of Tutsi and in massacres of moderate
Hutus between April and July 1994. [FN32]
B. Propaganda
The Rwandan genocide was not a chance incident. Nor did it arise solely in response to President Habyarimana's death. The genocide was the culmination of sweeping efforts that had been meticulously planned over a
period of years. The participation of the broader population was a critical aspect of the Rwandan genocide; coworkers killed co-workers, neighbors killed neighbors, friends killed friends, husbands killed wives. In fact, a
Rwandan theologian has argued that the genocide would have been inconceivable before the 1990s and that it
took four years of preparation to make mass violence possible. [FN33] To this end, the media participated in a
“structured attempt to use media to influence awareness, attitudes, or behavior.” [FN34] The intensive propa-
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ganda campaign fueled and funded by Hutu extremists was perhaps the most effective element of this plan.
[FN35] Hutu extremists successfully spread hate speech that would prove remarkably essential and effective before, during, and after the genocide. [FN36]
*741 1. Generally--Print & Radio
The print media was an effective tool for disseminating information to the populace in Rwanda. For example, Rwandan newspapers were published in the capital, but urban workers carried the better known ones
back to the hills when traveling home for the weekends. [FN37] Sixty-six percent of the Rwandan population
was literate, and those who could read, read to others who could not. [FN38] Hutu supporters exerted substantial
influence over the print media. Approximately eleven of the forty-two new journals founded in 1991 were linked
to the akazu, a “special circle within the larger network of personal connections that worked to support Habyarimana.” [FN39]
A newspaper called Kangura was one of the most powerful voices of hate. [FN40] Kangura described itself
as “the voice that seeks to awake and guide the majority people.” [FN41] While the paper had a modest circulation, its distribution included local burgomasters, [FN42] and *742 it received active support from powerful military and government patrons. [FN43] In fact, government credit defrayed Kangura's costs, and Rwanda's mayors received free copies to distribute. [FN44] Furthermore, Kangura played a role in the dissemination of antiTutsi sentiments at a time when “government officials still felt publicly constrained by international pressure
from speaking openly of ethnicity.” [FN45]
Kangura published a flurry of articles and cartoons vehemently disparaging Tutsis and advocating Hutu supremacy. For example, in March 1993, Kangura published an article criticizing the Tutsi entitled, A Cockroach
Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly. [FN46] In December of the same year, a photograph of Grégoire Kayibanda,
leader of the Hutu Revolution and the first president of Rwanda, appeared on the cover of Kangura with a machete, a cynical comment describing the Hutu as the race of God, and a reference to defeating the Tutsis once
and for all. [FN47] The Ten Commandments of the Hutu, published in 1990, was perhaps the most famous and
influential article to appear in Kangura. The Commandments espoused a “doctrine of militant Hutu purity,” declaring the Tutsi an enemy of the Hutu people. [FN48]
Radio, however, was the most important and influential medium through which the Rwandan population received information. Approximately 29% of households had radios. In urban areas, the number rose to 58.7%.
[FN49] These figures, however, were likely higher by the start of the genocide since “in some areas, the government distributed radios free to local authorities before the *743 genocide and they may have done so after the
killing began as well.” [FN50] People without radios listened to them at bars or obtained information from their
neighbors. [FN51] In 1991, Rwanda had only one radio station, Radio Rwanda. [FN52] Radio Rwanda was the
voice of the government (the MRND) and of President Habyarimana himself. It announced, for example, various
political meetings, removals from public office, and examination results for admission to secondary schools.
[FN53] Radio Rwanda sometimes broadcast false information, particularly on the progress of the civil war that
preceded the genocide, but most people did not have access to independent sources of information with which to
verify its claims. [FN54]
Radio Rwanda underwent significant changes, however, in 1992. After the establishment of a coalition government in April, [FN55] the coalition parties called for a new, more moderate direction for Radio Rwanda.
[FN56] Ferdinand Nahimana, a staunch MRND supporter, was removed from his position as supervisor of Radio
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Rwanda. Several months later, Jean-Marie Vianney Higuro, a member of an opposing party, was named director
with a view to steering the station toward taking a more non-partisan stance. [FN57]
In response, Hutu extremists created their own station. Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM),
incorporated in April 1993, began broadcasting in August of the same year. MRND supporters comprised an
overwhelming majority of RTLM's *744 founders. [FN58] The purpose of RTLM was “to prepare the people of
Rwanda for genocide.” [FN59] Indeed, the RTLM argued that the war against Tutsi domination would not only
require the participation of the armed forces, but also that of the entire Rwandan population. [FN60] Furthermore, RTLM's founders designed it to appeal to particularly vulnerable populations: delinquents, the unemployed, and gangs of thugs within the militia. [FN61] RTLM broadcast on the same frequencies as Radio
Rwanda between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., when Radio Rwanda was not transmitting. This situation “encouraged
listeners to see the two as linked, if not as identical.” [FN62]
Through radio transmission, the Hutu extremists taught listeners that the Hutu and Tutsi were two different
people and that the Tutsi were foreign conquerors who had refused to accept their loss of power in the 1959 revolution. [FN63] The RTLM broadcasts warned the Tutsi: “You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh!
We won't let you kill! We will kill you!” [FN64] The same themes appeared in *745 the propaganda both before
and during the genocide, [FN65] suggesting a “deliberate coordination among propagandists and between them
and government officials.” [FN66]
Radio transmissions were a critical component of the genocide. [FN67] In fact, “[d]uring the genocide, when
communications and travel became difficult, the radio became for most people the sole source of news as well as
the sole authority for interpreting its meaning.” [FN68] After the RTLM identified and criticized an individual,
the Interahamwe would immediately seek him out and kill him. [FN69] Therefore, the RTLM exercised extensive and pervasive influence over the militia. [FN70] In addition, the RTLM recognized that the participation-both direct and indirect--of the entire Rwandan population was necessary to the success of the genocide. For
example, during a broadcast after the genocide had begun, an announcer stated: “Stand up, take action . . .
without worrying about interna-tional opinion.” [FN71]
Additionally, the RTLM employed various narrative tech-niques to convince the Hutu population that the
Tutsi posed a significant threat to Hutu lives and livelihoods. The messages conveyed the idea that the Hutu
must “kill or be killed” and *746 emphasized that the deaths the Hutu would face at the hands of the Tutsi would
be particularly gruesome. [FN72]
2. Gender Propaganda
It is critical to understand the importance of gender and hate propaganda in the genocidal campaign. Gender
issues comprised significant elements of the “social construction of boundaries between ethnic groups and . . .
notions of racial purity.” [FN73] As such, a consideration of gender sheds light on the genocide's complex psychological components, thus clarifying the mass violence and destruction that characterized the tragic events of
1994. [FN74]
A brief description of inter-ethnic relationships in Rwanda places in context the preoccupation with gender
evident throughout the genocide. Although not the norm, conjugal unions between the Tutsis and Hutus were not
uncommon in the decades preceding the genocide. [FN75] Marriages between Tutsi women and Hutu men,
however, were much more common than marriages between Tutsi men and Hutu women. [FN76] Since ethnicity
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was determined along patrilineal lines, the offspring of Tutsi women and Hutu men were legally Hutu. [FN77]
As such, these marriages “conferred the full benefits of Hutu citizenship to progeny who were perceived by
many as racially impure.” [FN78]
*747 As the Hutu extremists methodically differentiated between Hutu and Tutsi, [FN79] they advanced a
purer, reified version of Hutu culture. To this end, they discouraged procreation between Hutu men and Tutsi
women. [FN80] Tutsi women became the “pivotal enemies” in the Hutu extremists' struggle because “they were
socially positioned at the permeable boundary between the two ethnic groups.” [FN81] Thus, Tutsi women's ethnicity and gender made them particularly vulnerable to attack. [FN82]
Gender hate propaganda was perhaps the most virulent component of the propaganda campaign. Propagandists portrayed Tutsi women as enemies of the state, used by Tutsi men to “infiltrate Hutu ranks.” [FN83] Propagandists claimed Tutsi women were more beautiful and desirable, but “inaccessible to Hutu men whom they allegedly looked down upon and were ‘too good for.”’ [FN84] This characterization led to what one Tutsi woman
explained as an indescribable hate. [FN85] As such, “[r]ape served to shatter these images by humiliating, degrading, and ultimately destroying the Tutsi woman.” [FN86]
*748 Propagandists presented Tutsi women as sexual objects. [FN87] Extremist literature contained cartoons
that portrayed Tutsi women in sexual positions with various politicians. [FN88] The literature also depicted Tutsi women as prostitutes who used their sexual charms to seduce the Western forces stationed in Rwanda. For example, a cartoon appeared in print, depicting Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, head of the U.N. peacekeeping
force in Rwanda before and during the genocide, in an embrace with scantily clad Tutsi women. The cartoon
read: “General Dallaire and his army have fallen into the trap of fatal women.” [FN89]
In fact, the campaign against Tutsi women well preceded the actual genocide. In 1990, four years before the
start of the genocide, Tutsi women were frequently the centerpiece of propagandist efforts to heighten ethnic
tensions and engender hatred. The Ten Command-ments of the Hutu appeared in a December issue of Kangura.
Four of these “commandments” dealt specifically with women:
Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who: marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi
woman; employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine.
Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as
woman, wife, and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
*749 Hutu woman, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October [1990] war
has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi. [FN90]
These commandments clearly demonstrate a fixation with demonizing Tutsi women. [FN91] Tutsi women
were described as enemy infiltrators, Hutu women were exalted above Tutsi women, and inter-marrying between
Hutu men and Tutsi women was fiercely discouraged. In addition, a later issue of Kangura criticized Tutsi women for monopolizing employment in the public and private sectors, thus contributing to the unemployment of
the Hutu. [FN92]
These images and characterizations clearly affected the psyche of the participants in the genocide. Rape survivors have recounted statements of their violators such as:
We want to see how sweet Tutsi women are.
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You Tutsi women think that you are too good for us.
We want to see if a Tutsi woman is like a Hutu woman.
If there were peace you would never accept me. [FN93]
These statements reveal that propagandists' efforts success-fully demonized Tutsi women, thus increasing
their vulnerability to sexual violence throughout the genocide.
The link between the gender-based hate propaganda and sexual violence is clear. Propagandists used sexualized images of Tutsi women to instigate ethnic hate and conflict. These images incited hatred of these women
and of their sexuality. Thus, both *750 ethnic and gender stereotypes, functioning individually and jointly,
fueled the sexual violence committed against Tutsi women. [FN94]
C. Sexual Violence
“Rape is a crime worse than others. There's no death worse than that.” [FN95] The figure of five hundred
thousand to one million deaths mentioned above [FN96] does not include the thousands of women whose lives
were spared, but who were left to experience a living death. Sexual violence, [FN97] primarily committed
against Tutsi women, was rampant throughout the genocide. In 1996, René Degni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, reported that women “may even be regarded as the main victims of the
massacres, with good reason, since they were raped and massacred and subjected to other brutalities.” [FN98]
The total number of women affected remains unclear. The official figure reported for rape cases provided by the
Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women--15,700--was most likely a gross underestimate. [FN99]
An *751 approximation based on the number of resulting pregnancies, however, yields a number ranging from
250,000 to 500,000 rapes. [FN100]
1. Types of Sexual Violence
While many women were massacred along with the men throughout the genocide, the perpetrators often
spared women from death, instead sentencing them to rape and humiliation. [FN101] The violation of Tutsi women was not a casualty of war, but “a step in the process of deconstruction of the Tutsi group-- destruction of
the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.” [FN102] The sexual violence took many forms. [FN103] The Interahamwe militia and the military raped Tutsi women and girls, forced them into collective and individual sexual slavery, and mutilated them. [FN104] Even very young children did not escape the terror; the victims ranged
from two years old to over fifty years old. [FN105] Furthermore, pregnant women or women who had recently
given birth were not spared; their rapes frequently resulted in death from hemorrhaging and other medical complications. [FN106] Moreover, the perpetrators forced some women “to kill their own children before or after
being raped.” [FN107]
The militia worked in groups, taking Tutsi women from their homes or out of hiding and gang-raping them,
often multiple times. [FN108] Many of the women who survived an individual or gang rape were picked up by
another group of Interahamwe and raped again. [FN109] Furthermore, the military and civilian authorities-including regular soldiers, members of the national police force, members of the elite *752 Presidential Guard,
burgomasters, and heads of sectors--condoned and encouraged the sexual violence. [FN110]
The militia commonly employed sexual mutilation and public humiliation to heighten the suffering of their
victims. Some women and girls “were stripped and/or slashed and exposed to public mockery” while others “had
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pieces of trees branches pushed into their vagina.” [FN111] Moreover, the perpetrators tortured their victims by
mutilating their genitals and cutting off their breasts and buttocks. [FN112]
The military also collectively detained the women so that they could provide sexual services. These women
experienced rape and gang rape. [FN113] Some women were held for the duration of the genocide. [FN114]
Others were forced to move to neighboring countries with the militia once the genocide ended. [FN115]
In addition, the militia members held individual women for personal sexual service. They locked these women in their homes or in the homes of militia members for varying durations. [FN116] While some termed the
arrangement “forced marriage” and called the women “wives,” in reality, the militia held these women captive
in sexual slavery. [FN117]
*753 Thus, the gendered anti-Tutsi images and rhetoric that pervaded Rwandan society through genderbased hate propaganda were translated into the systemic violation of Rwandan women during the genocide. The
“indescribable hate” instigated through gender hate propaganda played out in a horrific pattern of sexual violence, the effects of which continue to be felt by its survivors.
2. Effects of Sexual Violence
The psychological, social, and physical aspects of such appalling sexual violations have unalterably affected
the survivors. In a society that has traditionally regarded women as dependents of their male relatives and first
and foremost as wives and mothers, [FN118] sexual violence has particularly devastating effects. For example,
traditional Rwandan society values women for the number of children they can produce. [FN119] Thus, physical
mutilation and violence produces a dual harm: a physical harm based on the injury itself, and an emotional and
social harm for the woman who can no longer reproduce and thus fulfill her role as a mother.
In fact, U.N. Special Rapporteur Degni-Ségui found that “psychological problems have been what the victims . . . have most commonly shared.” [FN120] There are varied sources of the shame associated with sexual
violence. For example, African tradition prohibits the sexual acts committed and considers them taboo. [FN121]
The stigmatization associated with these acts has compounded their detrimental effects on the victims. Indeed,
victims of sexual violence have demonstrated a variety of responses ranging from over-sensitivity and shame to
“a form of madness.” [FN122]
The sexual violence also has resulted in social exclusion. As one survivor explained, “after rape, you don't
have value in the community.” [FN123] Girls fearing that they are no longer able to find husbands have fled
their homes to live in seclusion and anonymity. [FN124] *754 Thus, although these women's lives were theoretically spared, their traumatic experiences have robbed them of their community and identity.
Forced impregnation has had deep psychological effects on Tutsi women. Suffered exclusively by women,
forced pregnancy involves a violation of, among other things, reproductive freedom and sexual autonomy,
[FN125] and has lasting effects given that the women may then have to raise the offspring. Tutsi women who
became pregnant have suffered intense shame and ostracization in a society that is particularly unwilling to accept unwed mothers. [FN126] Moreover, mistreatment by society, including by their own families, has led many
unmarried mothers to resort to abortion or infanticide. [FN127] The passage of time is unlikely to cure the psychological harm done to the victims of forced impregnation. [FN128]
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Women also suffered the various physical effects associated with sexual violence. Indeed, “[t]he physical injuries and their consequences range[d] from mere abrasions to instant death, and include infection with sexually
transmissible diseases,” including HIV. [FN129] Rwanda has one of the highest rates of HIV-positive persons,
and “militiamen carrying the virus used it as a ‘weapon,’ . . . intending to cause delayed death.” [FN130]
Furthermore, the effect on Tutsi women's reproductive capacity may be expressed in both physical and psychological terms. For example, one survivor expressed: “After the war, I found out that I was pregnant. But I
had an abortion . . . no, not really an abortion. *755 The baby just came out dead.” [FN131] Thus, this survivor
had to endure not only a physical risk, but also the psychological damage resulting from a stillbirth.
Ultimately, sexual violence had harsh and lasting conse-quences for Tutsi women. The harm experienced by
Tutsi women has been particularly severe in light of the physical, psychological, and social impact that it continues to have on their daily lives. [FN132] With a population that is estimated to be seventy percent female,
[FN133] the magnitude of the detrimental effects on Rwandan society as a whole cannot be underestimated. Tutsi women were violated on multiple levels: as Tutsis, as women, and as Tutsi women. An analysis of their experiences and the attendant legal implications requires an under-standing of the ways in which their multiple identities situated them within the conflict.
III. Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Intersectionality

A. Intersectional Theory
Kimberlé Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality provides a useful framework within which to position
crimes based on both gender and racial/ethnic animus. Crenshaw argues that the lives of women of color are
shaped by identity-based categories such as race and gender. [FN134] As such, many of their experiences arise
at the *756 intersection of these identities. Thus, they are not necessarily compounded by the simultaneous effect of race and gender, but are the result of distinct vulnerabilities created by the overlapping of these identities.
Crenshaw addresses three aspects of the subordination of women of color: “the structural dimensions of
domination (structural intersectionality), the politics engendered by a particular system of domination (political
intersectionality), and the representations of the dominated (representational intersectionality).” [FN135] The
latter two forms of domination are relevant to the present analysis. Political intersectionality speaks to the ways
in which a group's political interests are “obscured and sometimes jeopardized by political strategies that ignore
or suppress intersectional issues.” [FN136] Thus, for example, while hate propaganda has garnered significant
attention in the ICTR, gender hate propaganda and its implications for the experiences of Tutsi women has gone
largely unexamined. By representational intersectionality, Crenshaw refers to the ways in which “race and
gender converge so that the concerns of minority women fall into the void between concerns about women's issues and concerns about racism.” [FN137] Therefore, as discussed in further detail infra, international human
rights frameworks are fragmented into gender claims and race/ethnicity claims, thus creating a void for violations with both gender and racial dimensions. [FN138]
Crenshaw's argument highlights the importance of an intersectional analysis of women's experiences. Crenshaw maintains that women of color's intersectional identities place them within discourses that are shaped to respond to race or to gender, thus *757 marginalizing them within both. [FN139] Indeed, anti-racism and femin-
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ism fall short “[b]ecause women of color experience racism in ways not always the same as those experienced
by men of color and sexism in ways not always parallel to experiences of white women.” [FN140] Thus, an analysis that neglects either the gender or the racial elements of crimes against women of color, or does not adequately address the particular vulnerabilities created by their intersection, fails to capture the victims' experiences. [FN141]
Crenshaw has examined the ways in which Black women's intersectional identities shape their interaction
with the United States justice system. In anti-discrimination law, Black women, who may have distinct experiences from both Black men and White women, may fall outside of both the law's gender and race protections.
For example, in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, [FN142] the Eighth Circuit questioned the district court's refusal to accept a Title VII claim based on both sex and race. [FN143] Crenshaw points out that “[t]he court's
conclusion that Congress did not intend to allow Black women to make a compound claim arises from its inability to imagine that discrimination against Black women can exist independently from the experiences of White
women or of Black men.” [FN144] In another *758 case, Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, [FN145] the federal circuit found that the district court had not abused its discretion when it refused to certify a class of Black women
in race and gender discrimination. The district court had held that Black women could not represent women as a
class because their intention to include race was at odds with the allegation of discrimination against women.
[FN146] These examples demonstrate the U.S. justice system's inability to handle situations in which Black women's harm may result because Black women are “in the intersection,” and not because they suffer race discrimination or sex discrimination or both. [FN147] As discussed in detail below, similar dynamics exist within the
international human rights framework. [FN148]
Moreover, these analyses reveal that women's experiences may reflect a complex set of factors that transcends both race and sex. Thus, for example, Black women in the U.S. often suffer double discrimination on the
basis of both race and sex, “[a]nd sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women-- not the sum of
race and sex discrimination, but as Black women.” [FN149] Crenshaw argues that “[w]here their experiences are
distinct, Black women will encounter difficulty articulating their claims as long as approaches prevail which
completely obscure problems of intersectionality.” [FN150]
Various scholars have echoed and built upon Crenshaw's arguments. [FN151] For example, Lisa Crooms has
applied Crenshaw's intersectional theory to address the inadequacy of the International *759 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention), [FN152] as ratified by the United States,
with respect to the human rights of women of color. [FN153] Crooms argues for the inclusion of “multiple identities of women across cultural, national, religious, ethnic, and racial barriers,” within the international human
rights arena. [FN154] In her application of this standard to the U.S. ratification of the Race Convention, Crooms
shows that the ratification is a qualified endorsement, dismissing many rights and duties recognized in international human rights law that dispro-portionately affect many women of color. [FN155] The Race Convention
provides for various economic and social rights not recognized by the United States. It recognizes both disparate
treatment and disparate impact in discrimination claims, [FN156] protects against hate speech and punishes racist hate propaganda, [FN157] and encourages affirmative measures designed to benefit racial groups. [FN158]
U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations to the Race Convention, however, allow it to avoid complying with those very measures that would prove beneficial to women of color. [FN159] Crooms thus affirms that
if the Race Convention had been ratified without reservations, its more generous provisions may have provided
greater coverage for women of color than is currently available under U.S. domestic law. Crooms's analysis
demonstrates the way in which Crenshaw's theory applies to the international human rights context.
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*760 1. Intersectionality, Violence, Rape, and War
An intersectional analysis also sheds light on the way in which women experience violence, rape, and war.
Violence against women in general is often the result of a number of intersecting factors. For example, Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol argues for the repositioning of the concept of violence
within a broader framework that includes, considers, and aims to eradicate (1) psychological, social,
and political subordination of women; (2) male dominant (and female subservient) cultural and traditional
practices; as well as (3) economic marginalization and subjugation of women. [FN160]
Hernandez-Truyol not only recognizes the multiple factors that influence how women experience violence,
but also points to “the close nexus between economic dependence and marginalization to physical victimization.” [FN161] Thus, while Hernandez-Truyol's analysis does not address the significance of race and ethnicity,
one can extend her framework to conclude that those factors would further complicate the way in which violence
affects women.
While an intersection of factors informs women's experiences of violence in general, this intersection is particularly critical to the way in which rape affects women of an ethnic or racial minority. Crenshaw provides a
useful analysis of the social construction of the rape of Black women in the United States within an intersectional framework. She argues that the racism and sexism reflected in the dominant conceptualization of rape as involving a Black offender and White victim have led to the “devaluation of Black women and the marginalization
of their sexual victimizations.” [FN162] Thus, the rape of Black women has historically received less attention
and concern within the rape discourse. Indeed, White women have tended to be the beneficiaries of policies supported by feminists, while Black men have tended to be the beneficiaries of the Black community's concern
about racism and rape. [FN163]
*761 Such an intersectional analysis is equally applicable outside of the U.S., particularly to women of color
who have experienced violence in war based on their intersectional position in societies. Their experiences are
affected by the increased salience of ethnicity and gender in war situations. [FN164] While sexual violence is
not new to either international or domestic conflict, its prevalence increases during genocidal campaigns. For example, sexual violence was well-documented in the Bosnian genocide in which mass rape was “directed toward
women because they [were] Muslim or Croatian.” [FN165] Indeed, “women's experience of rape in war, like
that of women's human rights abuse more generally, is always determined by a variety of factors, including race,
class, religion, ethnicity, and nationality.” [FN166] Thus, while rape in war, and more specifically in genocide,
is a political act based on ethnic or racial hatred, courts should not divorce it from its sexual aspects. [FN167]
Women are targets during war, precisely because they are often a particularly vulnerable population. In
many societies, including the Rwandan/Tutsi society, [FN168] women's “protected status” leaves them exposed
to the consequences of violence and rape because their sexual violation will shame them as well as their communities. [FN169] Thus, women of color experience violence on multiple levels: as members of a particular
community and as women.
B. Application of an Intersectional Analysis at the ICTR
The incitement of sexual violence and genocide through hate propaganda targeting Tutsi women provides a
clear example of a crime committed against a vulnerable population due to both ethnicity and gender. It is critical that the ICTR pay adequate *762 attention to and prosecute those responsible for all hate propaganda, but it is
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particularly crucial that gender hate propaganda receives adequate attention and analysis. Since women “may be
regarded as the main victims of the massacres,” [FN170] the ICTR must include an analysis of the propaganda
that sexualized and demonized Tutsi women. A simple feminist or race-conscious analysis is not sufficient to
capture the violations of Tutsi women. Indeed, either analysis would over-simplify the complexity of their experiences and their particular vulnerabilities. Instead, the court should look at the gender hate propaganda
through an intersectional lens.
The Media Trial [FN171] provides the ICTR with an opportunity to address the critical intersection between
ethnicity and gender in the Rwandan genocide. Ideally, its legal analysis should address the ways in which this
intersection was manifested in the gender hate propaganda and resulting sexual violence. In order to assure that
Tutsi women receive recognition and justice for the full extent of their violations and that those responsible are
held accountable, the tribunal should focus on the absence of appropriate international law standards for addressing Tutsi women's intersectional experience. The ICTR, however, is bound by the limitations of its statute,
which does not advance a clearly intersectional approach to crimes committed during the genocide. Nevertheless, even if the ICTR were not limited in the scope of the crimes it may prosecute, applicable international human rights treaties offer little assistance in providing an intersectional approach to analyzing hate propaganda
based on both a gender and a racial animus as incitement of genocide.
1. Limitations of the ICTR Statute
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda provides the tribunal's jurisdictional competence. The tribunal may prosecute individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. [FN172]
*763 Genocide, as defined by the statute, is based upon acts committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” [FN173] Likewise, “crimes against humanity” are “crimes
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.” [FN174] While in Akayesu the tribunal determined that rape constitutes genocide, [FN175] and the statute in fact enumerates rape among acts that may constitute crimes against humanity,
[FN176] the actual language of the statute turns on identity markers other than gender. In Akayesu, the tribunal
also defined public incitement of genocide under the ICTR statute's Article 2(3)(c) as:
[D]irectly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through speeches, shouting, or
threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offers for sale
or display of written material or printed matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through the
public display of placards or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual communication. [FN177]
While this definition seems likely to successfully cover the actions of propagandists whose ethnic hate propaganda and gender-ethnic hate propaganda incited various genocidal acts, the general conception of genocide
continues to exclude gender.
The exclusion of gender within the particular definitions of the crimes is not unanticipated, as most international human rights *764 treaties do not explicitly recognize violence against women as genocide or crimes
against humanity. [FN178] Thus, the legal analysis of sexual violence against Tutsi women as a violation of human rights, within the confines of the ICTR statute, is largely based on its effects on their ethnicity, and not as a
violation of their womanhood. While Akayesu has clearly made progress in conceptualizing rape as a grave
breach of international human rights law, sexual violence perpe-trated against and experienced by Tutsi women
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has not been subjected to an intersectional analysis. Notably, the ICTR is limited by the subject matter jurisdiction set out in Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the ICTR Statute, which is based in international humanitarian law.
However, it is arguable that international human rights treaties might provide an additional lens through which
the tribunal could analyze these crimes.
2. Limitations in International Human Rights Law
Unfortunately, international human rights treaties provide little assistance in addressing the intersection of
identity factors in women of color's experiences of violence. Various international treaties address gender, race,
and incitement to commit violence and genocide, but they do not adequately examine the persecution of individuals based on both gender and race. In fact, Catharine MacKinnon has argued that international human rights
conventions do not effectively address the range of violence experienced by women. [FN179] If, as MacKinnon
states, the conventions fail to capture *765 women's experiences, there is little doubt that they are particularly
inadequate for women of color.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention), and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) individually provide protection against gender discrimination, race discrimination, and incitement to commit violence and genocide. [FN180] The experiences of
Tutsi women, however, and the role played by hate propaganda in the incitement of sexual violence, can be adequately addressed only through the integration of the rights protected in all four documents.
Although the ICCPR, like most international treaties, explicitly protects the right to freedom of speech,
[FN181] it also prohibits propaganda for war and incitement. Article 20(1) prohibits “[a]ny propaganda for
war,” while Article 20(2) states that “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by law.” [FN182] Furthermore, the Human
Rights Committee has explained that Article 20(2) extends to all forms of propaganda “directed against any
*766 advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence, whether such propaganda or advocacy has aims which are internal or external to the State concerned.”
[FN183] Incitement to commit gender violence, however, does not qualify. In fact, during the drafting of the ICCPR, the Philippines proposed the inclusion of sex, but this proposal was not adopted. [FN184]
The Genocide Convention also prohibits incitement. Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention declares that
“[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide,” shall be punishable. [FN185] However, the definition of
genocide does not include a gender component. [FN186] Thus, genocide, as defined in international law, does
not explicitly address gender considerations.
The Race Convention appears to provide the most thoroughly defined coverage of incitement. Article 4(a)
prohibits
all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including financing thereof. [FN187] In fact, the Race Convention Committee has indicated that states must penalize
four categories of misconduct: “(i) dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred; (ii) in-
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citement to racial hatred; (iii) acts of violence against any race or group of persons of *767 another colour
or ethnic origin; and (iv) incitement to such acts.” [FN188] Nevertheless, the Race Convention does not
mention gender.
While the Women's Convention does not directly address incitement, for the purposes of gender hate propaganda against Tutsi women, Article 2(d) and (e) provides some insight into how international instruments might
address the intersection of identity factors in women of color's experiences of violence. Article 2(d) demands
that States Parties “refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and . . . ensure
that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation.” [FN189] Article 2(e) calls
for States Parties to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.” [FN190] Furthermore, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) has asserted that gender-based violence is discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 of
the Women's Convention. [FN191] A strong argument can be made that a government that did not prevent or
punish the incitement of gender-based violence failed to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women.” While the Women's Convention does not appear to explicitly condemn incitement and hate
propaganda, CEDAW has recommended that States Parties take “effective measures . . . to ensure that the media
respect and promote respect for women.” [FN192] Thus, the Women's Convention may provide some protection
against gender-based hate propaganda.
Tutsi women were violated because they were Tutsi and because they were women. Or, to use Crenshaw's
language, the militia and army raped and sexually violated Tutsi women because of their position “in the intersection.” Thus, these acts, and their incitement, violated Tutsi women's rights under a number of international
treaties. However, a single treaty does not appear to *768 adequately address the extent and severity of violations that gender-ethnic hate propaganda caused, or the need to punish those who incited the violence.
3. Toward a More Inclusive Conceptualization of Inter-national Law
Fortunately, many international bodies have recently recog-nized the importance of addressing the link
between gender and racial discrimination. The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognizes the
importance of gender-based violence and provides a fitting link between such violence and race and ethnic violence. The statute includes “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity,” within its definition of crimes against humanity.
[FN193] Furthermore, Article 7(1)(h) provides that “[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity”
may constitute a crime against humanity and includes gender as a grounds for persecution “that [is] universally
recognized as impermissible under international law.” [FN194] The inclusion of gender here is critically important. Indeed,
[t]he recognition of gender as an individual and collective identity which, like race, ethnicity and religion, is capable of being targeted for persecution, and thus merits specific protection under international
law, is an explicit articu-lation of what has been an obvious omission in earlier codifications and formal
definitions of crimes against humanity. [FN195] Article 7(1)(h) provides a strong example of a legal
standard that is inclusive of gender and race considerations; these are both essential *769 to adequately
address incitement to commit inter-ethnic sexual violence.
U.N. experts also have begun to recognize the relationship between gender and racial discrimination. Thus,
the authors of a U.N. Development Fund for Women Background Paper have recognized that “[w]omen often
experience compounded or intersectional discrimination, in which their experience of gender discrimination in-

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

33 CLMHRLR 733
33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 733

Page 15

tersects with racism and intolerance.” [FN196] Moreover, Gay McDougall, a member of the U.N. Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, has argued that “[t]he gender dimensions of racial discrimination must
be fully considered and systematically addressed in order to remove all obstacles to equality, and to the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms encountered by both men and women.” [FN197]
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights also has affirmed the importance of taking a more intersectional approach to state reporting to the U.N.'s various committees. In 1996, the Human Rights Commission
[w]elcome[d] the emphasis by the persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies that the enjoyment
of the human rights of women should be closely monitored by each treaty body within the competence of
its mandate, and recommend[ed] that the reporting guidelines adopted by each treaty body be amended to
identify related gender-specific information to be addressed by States Parties in their reports. [FN198]
Thus, the United Nations has taken steps to promote, and at times, demand, the inclusion of gender considerations in its reporting mechanisms. To the extent that human rights treaty bodies employ strategies
that address the various ways that the intersection of gender and human rights creates particular experiences that merit review, the treaty bodies' analyses and decisions may provide a more *770 intersectional
understanding of the ways in which discrimination functions.
Despite the steps taken to integrate gender concerns into international human rights law, the inclusion of
gender within the actual definition of incitement of violence remains rare. The South African Constitution,
however, provides an excellent example through its inclusion of gender in its restriction on propaganda and incitement. Chapter 2, Article 16, section 2 provides that the freedom of expression (section 1) does not extend to
“advocacy of hate that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause
harm.” [FN199] Thus, South Africa has recognized that incitement based on gender merits equivalent legal
treatment with incitement based on race, ethnicity, and religion. While the inclusion of gender does not necessarily illustrate an acknowledgment of intersectional experiences, at the very least it acknowledges and condemns the existence of gender-based propaganda and incitement. Such an understanding facilitates the conceptualization of gender-ethnic propaganda and incitement.
These examples illustrate the international community's growing recognition that the combination of gender
and race/ethnicity has implications for the ways in which discrimination is experienced. They also set the stage
for the proposals and analyses that follow.
IV. Recommendations: Alternative Framework and Remedies
In order to assure that the experiences of Tutsi women are not lost in the various complicated issues surrounding the prosecution of hate propagandists, the ICTR should apply an inter-sectional analysis to the investigation, prosecution, judgment (e.g., legal analysis), and penalties in the Media Trial. In order to do so, the ICTR
would have to apply more creative analyses of the crimes, perhaps reaching beyond the explicit scope of the ICTR statute and individual human rights treaties. Such action will likely be necessary to capture Tutsi experiences
in their entirety and would provide a *771 groundbreaking opportunity for the tribunal to assure that crimes
against Tutsi women are properly adjudicated.
Gay McDougall has argued for the application of a method-ology for the analysis of the gender dimensions
of racial discrimination by the Race Convention Committee that would require a comprehensive analysis of,
among other things, the “compound effects of gender and race factors combined.” [FN200] Such an analysis
would focus on “(1) the form a violation takes, (2) the circumstances in which a violation occurs, (3) the con-
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sequences of a violation, and (4) the availability and accessibility of remedies and complaint mechanisms.”
[FN201] In its assessment of crimes committed through the mechanism of hate propaganda, the ICTR should apply a similar methodology in order to ensure that Tutsi women's unique experiences are captured in the tribunal's
analysis. To assure a truly intersectional analysis, however, the tribunal should not only address the “compound”
effects, but also the unique experiences that resulted from Tutsi women's position “in the intersection” of their
gender and ethnicity.
First, the hate propaganda in Rwanda had particularly gendered elements that led to specific forms of violence against Tutsi women. As discussed above, in addition to the general anti-Tutsi hate propaganda disseminated by the radio and print media, many of the statements, articles, cartoons, etc., were aimed specifically at Tutsi women. [FN202] The propaganda was often sexual in nature, depicting Tutsi women as prostitutes used by
their Tutsi brothers to weaken the Hutu. [FN203] It is not difficult to see a link between the sexual, often pornographic, nature of the propaganda and the resulting sexual violence. [FN204] Thus, the hate propaganda campaign was often gendered in specific ways that merit attention in the Media Trial.
*772 Second, the gender hate propaganda was propagated in a situation in which Tutsi women were particularly vulnerable. [FN205] Various scholars and international officials have recognized that women are vulnerable to sexual crimes during armed conflict, and even more so during genocidal campaigns. [FN206] In
Rwandan society, where women are traditionally expected to be “managed and protected” by the men in their
families and many women's lives centered on their roles as wife and mother, [FN207] Tutsi women faced specific vulnerabilities. In addition to the general terror experienced by Tutsis throughout the genocide, Tutsi women
were targets whose violation would achieve a two-fold purpose for the genocide's perpetrators: their personal
denigration, and the denigration of the men who were unable to protect them. [FN208] As such, Tutsi women
were exceptionally susceptible to the consequences of hate propaganda and the violence it incited.
Third, the gender hate propaganda incited sexual violence that resulted in harms specific to Tutsi women.
For example, unlike men, Tutsi women experienced forced pregnancies, which created significant difficulties,
both emotional and physical. Furthermore, many of the survivors of sexual violence continue to grapple with social stigmas and ramifications--in a society in which the role of wife and mother is central, what becomes of the
woman who is no longer “fit” for either?
*773 Finally, female victims of the violence face various barriers to legal remedies, including discrimination
in their private lives. The social stigmatization attached to sexual violence will likely discour-age many women
from demanding criminal prosecution of their perpetrators. Furthermore, emotional concerns will likely prompt
many women to avoid confronting their abusers in court. While the defendants in the Media Trial are not necessarily the men who actually violated Tutsi women, the stories that would have to be shared, and the discussion
of highly private and embarrassing sexual issues, will still discourage many women from participating.
In order to address these considerations adequately, the ICTR should reach beyond a single definition or
conceptualization of hate propaganda and incitement, to incorporate both gender and ethnicity. In particular, in
the event that the defendants in the Media Trial are found guilty, the Tribunal's reasoning should reflect a direct
link between its definition of public incitement of genocide [FN209] and its acknowledgment that sexual violence may constitute genocide. [FN210]
The implications of gender violence may also be an important consideration in addressing the types of criminal sentences imposed on the assailants and those who incited their behavior. [FN211] The ICTR statute clearly
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limits the tribunal to imposing criminal penalties. Article 23(1) explicitly states, “[T]he penalty imposed by the
Trial Chambers shall be limited to imprisonment.” [FN212] Furthermore, the statute calls for the Trial Chambers
to “have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda,” when determining
the terms of imprisonment. [FN213] Depending on the state of criminal penalties in Rwanda, however, it is unclear whether the exercise of such recourse would be beneficial for the purposes of punishing incitement through
gender hate propaganda.
In addition, persecution on the basis of gender and ethnicity should demand a stronger penalty. Just as state
statutes on group defamation in the United States increase the criminal penalties for *774 those convicted of
crimes motivated by racial, ethnic, or religious hatred, [FN214] crimes based on both a gender and a race/
ethnicity animus demand a more severe penalty. As discussed above, the ramifications of sexual violence in the
lives of Tutsi women are serious and far-reaching. [FN215] Furthermore, “the harm inflicted by rape may be
com-pounded by other concurrent violations against either the rape victim or those close to her,” [FN216] in addition to the continuing persecution and shame experienced by the victims. [FN217] Thus, sexual violence frequently involves multiple injuries to its victims. As such, those found guilty of committing such violence, as
well as those inciting its commission, should face sentences that take these multiple factors into consideration.
V. Conclusion
The incitement of gender-based violence and genocide [FN218] in Rwanda provides a clear example of women violated on the basis of their intersectional identities. Tutsi women experienced devastating violence as a
result of the incitement of violence and genocide through a propaganda campaign that specifically targeted them.
Propagandists consistently encouraged Hutus to view Tutsi women as enemies who used their sexuality to oppress the Hutu population. The use of sexualized imagery created intense hate for Tutsis, in general, and Tutsi
women, in particular. This hate was not incidental to the propaganda, but rather its aim.
Both print and radio's propaganda campaigns established an atmosphere of tension and hate in which genocidal acts that might normally seem unimaginable, benefited from the support of the military, local authorities,
and the general population. The attack on Tutsi women through the use of sexualized imagery and stereotypes
incited their sexual violation by actors in the genocide. As such, the *775 propaganda created and distributed
through the print and radio media clearly contributed to the widespread sexual violation of Tutsi women through
rape, sexual slavery, and mutilation.
Theories of intersectionality should inform the way in which the ICTR conceptualizes incitement through
hate propaganda and violence against Tutsi women. Tutsi women's position at the intersection of their race and
gender made them particularly vulnerable to attack. Propagandists used radio and print media to distribute images and ideas that would make these women's violations almost inevitable within the context of the genocide.
Rather than casualties of war, Tutsi women were a targeted population. In light of the extent of damage inflicted
upon Tutsi women, the instigators of genocidal sexual violence should be held accountable for the full effect of
their crimes.
In order for the ICTR to fully prosecute the defendants in the Media Trial, it must address the experiences of
Tutsi women and the role that hate propaganda played in their persecution. While international treaties do not,
on their face, necessarily provide an international legal standard for addressing the persecution of women of color (or in this instance, women of a particular ethnic group), international bodies have taken steps to recognize
the importance of gender in international legal analyses.
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The Media Trial also provides an opportunity for the ICTR to find non-governmental and non-military individuals responsible for the role they played in the genocide. The defendants--Barayagwiza, Nahimana, and
Ngeze--were indicted based on their actions as members of the Rwandan media that created and disseminated
hate propaganda that proved critical in the planning and implementation of the genocide. The ICTR, therefore,
should make a strong statement about the culpability of the media in the genocidal campaign and the recognition
that actions taken by non-military and non-governmental individuals may be successfully prosecuted for the
roles they played in the genocide.
The ICTR should also make the significant statement that sexist and misogynist portrayals of women that incite genocidal sexual violence, by non-military and non-governmental citizens, merit criminal prosecution.
Therefore, the ICTR must adequately analyze the impact hate propaganda had on Tutsi women.
Finally, the ICTR should take steps to assure that the women whose lives were affected by gender hate propaganda and the *776 resulting sexual violence are not lost within the broader context of hate propaganda. Thus,
the Tribunal's analyses should reflect an understanding of the intersectional nature of the crimes.
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[FN6]. A recent decision by the ICTR to exclude a witness's testimony on rape speaks to this general concern
that the Media Trial may not address persecutions particular to women. While the prosecution argued that rape
was generally a result of incitement by defendant Ngeze, the tribunal accepted the defense's argument that the
incident was too remote to the accused. Rwanda; Court Rules Out Rape Testimony, Afr. News, June 19, 2001,
LEXIS.
[FN7]. This Note relies on Kimberlé Crenshaw's exposition of intersectionality theory. See Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. 1241 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins]. This Note will not address the broader free
speech and causation arguments involved in the trial of propagandists. See generally Joshua Wallenstein, Note,
Punishing Words: An Analysis of the Necessity of the Element of Causation in Prosecutions For Incitement To
Genocide, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 351 (2001) (discussing free speech and causation arguments involved in the trial of
propagandists).
[FN8]. Rwanda; Accounting for the Rwandan Genocide--Impressions of the ‘Media’ Trial, Afr. News, Nov. 29,
2000, LEXIS.
[FN9]. Indeed, as Amy E. Ray argues with regard to sexual violence during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, “[t]o appreciate fully what the women have endured... it is imperative that the whole story be told
and that the sexual terrorism in all of its manifestations be revealed.” Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: GenderBased Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend
the Injuries, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 793, 798 (1997).
[FN10]. Lisa A. Crooms, Individual Rights and Intersectional Identities or, “What Do Women's Rights Have to
Do with the Race Convention?”, 40 How. L.J. 619, 634 (1997).
[FN11]. Rwanda was colonized first by Germany, then by Belgium. Prunier, supra note 2, at 25.
[FN12]. Id. at 5.
[FN13]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 31. In fact, the groups even shared the same war heroes:
“during the genocide, the killers and their intended victims sang of some of the same leaders from the Rwandan
past.” Id. (citing Jean-Pierre Chrétien et al., Rwanda, Les Média du Génocide 358 (1995)).
[FN14]. Prunier, supra note 2, at 5.
[FN15]. Id.
[FN16]. Id. Prior to the genocide, Rwanda was 80-85% Hutu, 15-20% Tutsi, and a little less than 1% Twa. See
Christopher Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994, at 39 (1999).
[FN17]. Prunier, supra note 2, at 5.
[FN18]. Id. at 6. The colonizers were, in effect, encouraging “tribalism without tribes,” classifications that reflected European racist aesthetic preferences. Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century
38 (Alison Marschner trans., New York University Press 1995) (1994).
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[FN19]. See Ian Fisher, If Only the Problem Were as Easy as Old Hatreds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2000, at 10
(explaining that colonist-imposed ideas of ethnic superiority contributed to the hierarchical divide in Rwanda);
see also Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
Rwanda 87 (2001) (explaining that the racialization of the Tutsi and Hutu was an “institutional construct...,
which in turn undergirded racial privilege and reproduced racial ideology”).
[FN20]. Taylor, supra note 16, at 42.
[FN21]. Id.
[FN22]. Id. at 67.
[FN23]. Id.
[FN24]. In his analysis of the Hamitic Hypothesis--the model used to delineate Tutsis and Hutus as races with
varying intellectual capacities-- Christopher Taylor points out that “the people who should be challenging this
history, intellectuals and policymakers of Rwanda and Burundi, are often the ones who employ it the most disingenuously.” Taylor, supra note 16, at 55.
[FN25]. Prunier, supra note 2, at 54.
[FN26]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 41; Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 12.
[FN27]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 12. The Arusha Accords also estab-lished a coalition government that
significantly lessened Habyarimana's power. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 124.
[FN28]. Prunier, supra note 2, at 212.
[FN29]. See infra Part II.B.
[FN30]. The Interahamwe militias,
(Kinyarwanda for “those who work together”), were civilian Hutu militias who actively participated in
the genocide, under the direction of the army and government authorities. Although the name Interahamwe officially described the youth wing of ... the former ruling party, the term came to refer to all militia participating in
the genocide, regardless of their party affiliation.
Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 40 n.62. In fact, before his death President Habyarimana actually provided the
military training of many of the youth who became the Interahamwe. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3,
at 4.
[FN31]. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families
156-57 (1998).
[FN32]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 12.
[FN33]. Tharcisse Gatwa, Ethnic Conflict and the Media: The Case of Rwanda, in Media Development 3, 19
(1995).
[FN34]. Christine L. Kellow & H. Leslie Steeves, The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide, 48 J. Comm.
107, 123 (1998).
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[FN35]. The ICTR has explicitly recognized the existence of the propaganda campaign. See Prosecutor v.
Akayesu,
Judgment,
No.
ICTR-96-4-T,
P
731
(Sept.
2,
1998),
available
at
http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm; see also Taylor, supra note 16, at
153 (discussing the elaborate preparation required to construct the social and psychological climate in which
genocide may occur, and how Hutu extremists mobilized propaganda for that purpose).
[FN36]. The use of propaganda to disseminate messages of hate was by no means unique to the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, hate propaganda was an incitement mechanism used to pit ethnic and religious groups against each
other in the former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human
Rights, 17 Harv. Women's L.J. 5 (1994) (describing the use of ethnically-charged pornography in the former
Yugoslavia). José Alvarez states that the hate propaganda in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia replicated the
“rhetoric, the tactics, and many of the arguments used by white supremacists in the United States or neo-Nazi
skinheads elsewhere in Europe.” José Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 Yale
J. Int'l L. 365, 379 (1999). As Alvarez points out, “Hate groups throughout the world, it seems, target perceived
enemies through nearly identical appeals. In all cases, the message conveyed is that members of the other group
are subhuman, not entitled to respect, and a threat to core values.” Id.
[FN37]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 67; see also Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 16
(“Although they had a relatively small circulation, mostly in the capital Kigali, these papers were often taken to
the countryside by urban workers on the weekends and their message was shared widely in rural communities.”).
[FN38]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 67.
[FN39]. Id. at 44, 67.
[FN40]. See William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 McGill L.J. 141, 145
(2000) (“[ Kangura] enjoyed enormous influence within the country.”).
[FN41]. Gourevitch, supra note 31, at 85; Int'l Ctr. Against Censorship, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship,
Propaganda and State-sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994, at 62 (1996) [hereinafter Broadcasting Genocide].
[FN42]. Rwanda was divided into twelve prefectures and sub-prefectures, which were further divided into communes, the “essential building blocks of the administration.” Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 41.
The burgomasters “exercised more immediate and pervasive power over the ordinary people than did his superiors.” Id.
[FN43]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 17. Kangura also played a critical role in the genocide by predicting
President Habyarimana's death in January 1994, and, therefore, contributed to the conception that the Tutsi were
responsible for the plane crash. See id.; Taylor, supra note 16, at 48. The true culprits were never determined.
Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 13.
[FN44]. Gourevitch, supra note 31, at 87.
[FN45]. Id. at 86.
[FN46]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 73.
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[FN47]. Id. at 72.
[FN48]. Gourevitch, supra note 31, at 88. For a more detailed discussion of The Ten Commandments of the
Hutu, particularly their gender components, see infra Part II.B.2.
[FN49]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 67 (citing Recensement Général de la Population et de
L'habitat au 15 Aout 1991, at 31 n.4 (1993)).
[FN50]. Id.
[FN51]. Id.
[FN52]. Id.
[FN53]. Id.
[FN54]. Id. at 68.
[FN55]. The Arusha Accords provided for a broad-based transitional government in which Habyarimana and his
group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the block of the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), Social
Democratic Party (PSD), the Liberal Party (PL), and the Democratic Christian Party (DPC) would share power.
President Habyarimana retained the presidency but would lose much of his power to a Council of Ministers in
which his party would only hold five of the nineteen seats. Id. at 124. For a more detailed discussion of the
Arusha Accords, see Mamdani, supra note 19, at 210-15.
[FN56]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 68.
[FN57]. Id.
[FN58]. Id. at 68-69. Forty of the fifty founders were from the three prefectures of northern Rwanda, and all but
seven were from the region identified with Habyarimana. One of the chief financiers, Félicien Kabuga, was a
wealthy businessman whose daughter was married to one of Habyarimana's sons. Another contributor, Alphonse
Ntilivamunda, was Habyarimana's son-in-law. There were two ministers among the founders: Augustin Ngirabatware, Minister of Planning, and André Ntagerura, Minister of Telecommunications. The group included Simon Bikindi, an employee of the Ministry of Youth and extremely popular musician best known for his virulently anti-Tutsi songs, as well as Pasteur Musabe, General Director of the Banque Continentale Africaine. The
Governor of the National Bank of Rwanda, Augustin Ruzindana, joined later. Id.; see also Mamdani, supra note
19, at 190 (stating that Kangura was “[f]unded by members and friends who gathered around the person of the
president's wife and constituted a key power group referred to as the akazua [sic]”).
[FN59]. Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide 71 (2000).
[FN60]. Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 41, at 114. This belief and the resulting propaganda is central to understanding how neighbors and friends turned against one another to commit such sadistic acts.
[FN61]. Melvern, supra note 59, at 70.
[FN62]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 69.
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[FN63]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 16. These inaccurate groupings reflected the racist colonial-era conceptions discussed above. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
[FN64]. Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 Am. J. Int'l
L. 628, 633 (1997) (citing Two African Presidents Are Killed in Plane Crash; Leaders of Rwanda, Burundi May
Have Been Shot Down, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1994, at 18).
[FN65]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 65.
[FN66]. Id.
[FN67]. Indeed, even “[w]ell before the Rwandan genocide ... United Nations officials and nongovernmental human rights organizations had asserted publicly that radio transmissions were playing a central role in inciting
ethnic tension and ethno-political murder.” Metzl, supra note 64, at 629.
[FN68]. Leave None to Tell the Story, supra note 3, at 71; Melvern, supra note 59, at 71.
[FN69]. Metzl, supra note 64, at 631.
[FN70]. Schabas, supra note 40, at 146 (“RTLM virtually coordinated the actions of the Interahamwe militia.”).
[FN71]. Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 41, at 114 (quoting an RTLM broadcast on April 15, 1994). In addition to the Interahamwe militia, “ordinary people were mobilized with little organization or training to pillage,
destroy, torture and kill.” Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 40 n.62.
[FN72]. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 34, at 124; see also Metzl, supra note 64, at 632 (“The RTLM goaded the
perpetrators to kill... its announcers declared, ‘If you do not want to have Rwandans exterminated... stand up,
take action.”’).
[FN73]. Taylor, supra note 16, at 151 . In addition, “conflict in Rwanda involved reasserting an imagined past
condition of patriarchy as well as the perpetuation of Hutu dominance.” Id. at 176-77.
[FN74]. Id. at 151.
[FN75]. Id. at 156.
[FN76]. Id. at 155; see also Mamdani, supra note 19, at 4 (discussing a conversation with a survivor of the massacre in Ntarama, in which the survivor indicated that prior to the genocide, in his secteur, two-thirds of the Tutsi women were married to Hutu men, but only one percent of Hutu women had Tutsi husbands).
[FN77]. Taylor, supra note 16, at 155.
[FN78]. Id.
[FN79]. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
[FN80]. Taylor, supra note 16, at 152. Indeed, persons of mixed heritage were perceived as particularly dangerous because they “could completely undermine the categories ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi,”’ and render ethnicity irrelevant. Id. at 156. Furthermore, mythical histories portrayed Tutsi women as using beauty to trick Hutu men into
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marrying them. Id. at 170-71.
[FN81]. Id. at 155.
[FN82]. Alvarez explains that “to the extent violence in... Rwanda... has been directed at women, perpetrators
there seem to have borrowed a page from age-old misogyny and the ageless tendency to target groups that are
among the least empowered.” Alvarez, supra note 36, at 379.
[FN83]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 16; see Note by the Secretary General Transmitting Reviews and Recommendations Concerning the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance Received From Special Agencies, Other International Organizations, Concerned United Nations Bodies and Regional Organizations, U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 1st Sess., P 21, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.189/PC.1/17 (2000) [hereinafter UNIFEM Proposals] (including UNIFEM Proposals for World Conference Against Racism).
[FN84]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 18.
[FN85]. Id. at 16.
[FN86]. Id. at 18.
[FN87]. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T, P 731 (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm. While I will not be exploring in detail the relationship between pornographic images and sexual violence, Catharine MacKinnon has extensively
analyzed pornography as a violation of human rights and as incitement of sexual violence. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Turning Rape Into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, Ms., July-Aug. 1993, at 24-30; see also
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 793 (1991) (arguing
that pornography should be actionable as a form of defamation and sex discrimination); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985) (suggesting that pornography
is a human rights violation).
[FN88]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Chrétien et al., supra note 13, at 368).
[FN89]. Taylor, supra note 16, at 171-72 (citing Chrétien et al., supra note 13, at 274).
[FN90]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 17-18; Taylor, supra note 16, at 174-75. Taylor notes that “Hutu extremists had to have accorded high priority to the question of relations between Hutu men and Tutsi women, for
the first three of the Ten Commandments concern this subject and this subject alone.” Id. at 174.
[FN91]. See Schabas, supra note 40, at 145 (“Tutsi were accused of using their two favorite weapons, ‘money
and Tutsi women.”’).
[FN92]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 18.
[FN93]. Id. at 18.
[FN94]. Id.
[FN95]. Id. at 59 (quoting a statement by Jeanne, a young woman who was abducted and “forcibly married”).
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[FN96]. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
[FN97]. The ICTR has defined sexual violence, which includes rape, as “any act of a sexual nature which is
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR96-4-T,
P
686
(Sept.
2,
1998),
available
at
http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm. Furthermore, in a recent case, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provided its first convictions
for enslavement as a crime against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-PT, PP 745, 782 (Feb.
22, 2001), available at http:// www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.html.
[FN98]. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. René Degni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 of the Resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., P 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 (1996) [hereinafter Degni-Ségui
Report].
[FN99]. According to the Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women, there were 15,700 cases of women raped during the genocide. This official figure, however, underestimated the total because it only covered
the period of the massacres and therefore did not include rapes that took place in refugee camps after the genocide. Furthermore, this figure did not take into consideration the numbers of women who were reluctant to admit
they had been raped. Id. P 16.
[FN100]. Statistics reveal that one pregnancy results from every 100 rapes. Id.
[FN101]. See Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 39.
[FN102]. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T, P 732 (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm.
[FN103]. In Akayesu, the ICTR recognized that many Tutsi women “were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public... and often by more than one assailant.” Id. P 731.
[FN104]. See Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 39-65.
[FN105]. Id. at 24.
[FN106]. Id. at 39.
[FN107]. Id.
[FN108]. Id. at 42.
[FN109]. Id.
[FN110]. Id. at 48.
[FN111]. Degni-Ségui Report, supra note 98, P 18.
[FN112]. Id.; Taylor, supra note 16, at 176.
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[FN113]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 52-53.
[FN114]. Id.
[FN115]. Id.
[FN116]. Id. at 56.
[FN117]. Id.; Taylor, supra note 16, at 176.
“[S]lavery” should be understood as the status or condition over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual abuse.
Critical elements in the definition of slavery are limitations on autonomy and on the power to decide matters relating to one's sexual activity and bodily integrity.
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Periods of Armed Conflict: Final Report
Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Subcomm'n on
Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., P 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13
(1998).
[FN118]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 19.
[FN119]. Id. at 20.
[FN120]. Degni-Ségui Report, supra note 98, P 21.
[FN121]. Id.
[FN122]. Id.
[FN123]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 25.
[FN124]. Degni-Ségui Report, supra note 98, P 22.
[FN125]. Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and
Consent, 32 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 625, 655 (2001).
[FN126]. Degni-Ségui Report, supra note 98, P 22.
[FN127]. Id. P 23.
[FN128]. See Boon, supra note 125, at 664 (noting that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights have
emphasized “the psychological harm done to the victims of rape, noting that the scars resulting from the humiliation, victimization, and condemnation from the communities were deep and not necessarily curable by the passage of time”).
[FN129]. Degni-Ségui Report, supra note 98, P 20.
[FN130]. Id.
[FN131]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 42-43 (quoting a survivor of the genocide who was raped by six mem-
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bers of the Interahamwe).
[FN132]. The effect of sexual violence on women is different than that on men: “[B]oth women and men of opposing ethnic groups may be targeted for rape, but only women can get pregnant as a result.” An Analysis of the
Gender Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, Background Paper Prepared by Ms. Gay McDougall, Member of
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for the First Session of the Preparatory Committee
of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 56th Sess., P 10, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/56/Misc.19
(2000) [hereinafter An Analysis of the Gender Dimensions of Racial Discrimination].
[FN133]. Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 2.
[FN134]. While much of the analysis regarding intersectionality discussed in this Section will address gender
and race, ethnicity is an easy substitute for race, and functions in much the same way. Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins, supra note 7, at 1241. Crenshaw recognizes, however, that factors such as class, sexual orientation,
age, and color are also often important elements in conceptualizing intersectionality. Kimberlé W. Crenshaw,
Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, in Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words That
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 111, 114 (1993) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny].
[FN135]. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 7, at 1241.
[FN136]. Id. at 1251. Deborah King also has critiqued how different identities in various movements are often
set aside and the way multiple oppression is marginalized within a movement that claims these women as their
members. Deborah King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 Signs 42 (1988).
[FN137]. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 7, at 1282.
[FN138]. See infra Part III.B.2.
[FN139]. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 7, at 1244.
[FN140]. Id. at 1252.
[FN141]. In fact, Catharine MacKinnon has argued that human rights principles are not inclusive of women's experiences. MacKinnon has argued:
What happens to women is either too particular to be universal or too universal to be particular, meaning either too human to be female or too female to be human.... What most often happens to women escapes the
human rights net.... Women's absence shapes human rights in substance and in form, effectively defining what a
human and a right are. If human rights principles do not capture women's experience, then they are clearly inadequate to address those experiences that are shaped by gender and other identities, such as race or ethnicity.
Catharine MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA Women's L.J. 59, 60 (1993).
[FN142]. 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
[FN143]. Kimberlé Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law & Politics, in The Politics
of Law: A Progressive Critique 195, 196 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique].
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[FN144]. Id. at 196.
[FN145]. 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
[FN146]. Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique, supra note 143, at 197-98.
[FN147]. Id. at 200. Additional U.S. cases also demonstrate this jurisprudential void. See, e.g., Paulette M.
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365, 371 (arguing
that Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), proceeds from the assumption that racism
and sexism are “fundamentally unrelated phenomena--a proposition proved false by history and contemporary
reality”). In addition, Caldwell has expressed trepidation that “those committed to eliminating dominance based
on race or gender, or both, continually fail to acknowledge or derive liberating strategies based on the fact of
race-sex interaction.” Id. at 375.
[FN148]. See infra Part III.B.2.
[FN149]. See Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique, supra note 143, at 200-01.
[FN150]. Id. at 197.
[FN151]. See, e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices
From the Margins, 3 J. Gender Race & Just. 373, 374-75 (2000) (addressing “[t]he intersection of colonialism,
patriarchy and violence and its consequences for black women”).
[FN152]. The Race Convention was the one of the first multilateral human rights treaties ever to be adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly. The Race Convention focuses on the multiple responsibilities of states to eliminate
all forms of racial discrimination. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Race
Convention].
[FN153]. Crooms, supra note 10, at 620.
[FN154]. Id. at 634.
[FN155]. Id. at 635-39.
[FN156]. Race Convention, supra note 152, art. 2(1).
[FN157]. Id. art. 4.
[FN158]. Id. art. 2(2).
[FN159]. Crooms, supra note 10, at 638.
[FN160]. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A Re/Conceptualization of Violence for
the 21st Century, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 607, 607 (1997).
[FN161]. Id. at 627.
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[FN162]. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 7, at 1268.
[FN163]. Id.
[FN164]. Darius M. Rejali, After Feminist Analyses of Bosnian Violence, in The Women and War Reader 26,
30 (Lois Ann Lorentzen ed., 1998).
[FN165]. MacKinnon, supra note 36, at 9.
[FN166]. Dorothy Thomas & Regan Ralph, Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity, SAIS Rev.,
Spring 1999, at 81, 91-99; see also Rejali, supra note 164, at 26 (“In a war context, racial and ethnic distinctions
have particular salience because they are violently renegotiated, complicating the relationship between ethnicity
and gender.”).
[FN167]. See Thomas & Ralph, supra note 166, at 88.
[FN168]. See supra Part II.C.2.
[FN169]. Thomas & Ralph, supra note 166, at 89.
[FN170]. Degni-Ségui Report, supra note 98, P 12.
[FN171]. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
[FN172]. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex,
3453d mtg. at 15, arts. 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
[FN173]. Id. art. 2(2). The statute provides that the following acts shall be punishable as genocide: genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide,
and complicity in genocide. Id. art. 2(3).
[FN174]. Id. art. 3.
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Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., P 7, U.N. Doc. A/47/38

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

33 CLMHRLR 733
33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 733

Page 30

(1992) [hereinafter CEDAW Rec. 19]. The U.N. General Assembly echoed CEDAW's action by adopting the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which defines violations of women's human rights
to equality . Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/48/104 (1993).
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and defilement to mutilation and torture to sexual murder, this abuse occurs in forms and settings and legal postures that overlap every recognized human rights convention but is addressed, effectively and as such, by
none.”).
[FN180]. Rwanda ratified the ICCPR, the Race Convention, and the Genocide Convention on April 16, 1975,
and the Women's Convention on March 2, 1981. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (as of June 17, 2002), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
[FN181]. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
[FN182]. Id. art. 20(1)-(2).
[FN183]. See General Comment 11 (Art. 20), Hum. Rts. Comm., 19th Sess., P 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1
(1983).
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1948, art. III(c), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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Convention also does not explicitly denounce hate propaganda. Schabas, supra note 40, at 162-67 (discussing
the Genocide Convention's lack of a prohibition of hate propaganda).
[FN187]. Race Convention, supra note 152, art. 4(a).
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Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 42nd Sess., P 3, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993).
[FN189]. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature
Dec. 18, 1979, art. 2(d), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
[FN190]. Id. art. 2(e).
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[FN191]. CEDAW Rec. 19, supra note 178, P 7.
[FN192]. Id. P 24(d).
[FN193]. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., art. 7(g), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999
(1998), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute]; see also Boon,
supra note 125 (discussing forced pregnancy in the ICC Statute).
[FN194]. ICC Statute, supra note 193, art. 7(1)(h).
[FN195]. Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict: Update to the Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 51st Sess., P 31, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21 (1998).
[FN196]. UNIFEM Proposals, supra note 83, P 1.
[FN197]. An Analysis of the Gender Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, supra note 132, P 4.
[FN198]. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Resolution
1996/22, U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1996/22 (1996).
[FN199]. S. Afr. Const. art. 16(2) (emphasis added), http:// www.concourt.gov.za/constitution/const02.html#16.
[FN200]. Commentary to the CERD General Recommendation on Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at 7, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/54/Misc.31 (1999).
[FN201]. Id.
[FN202]. See supra Part II.B.2.
[FN203]. See supra Part II.B.2.
[FN204]. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. It is important to note that, in the broader context, the
causal relationship between media images and violence alleged to result is sometimes contested. The general
concept, however, that media images have effects on the public has been recognized. For example, the American
Psychiatric Association has recognized the link between aggressive childhood behavior and children's exposure
to mass media portrayals of violence. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Psychiatric Effects of Media Violence, http://www.psych.org/public_info/media_violence.cfm (last visited June 15, 2002). In the context of the use of a
media campaign to incite genocide, the incitement was not simply an unanticipated result, but instead was the
goal. See also Kellow & Steeves, supra note 34, at 107 (explaining that the media “have been accused of spreading fear, rumor, and panic by using a kill-or-be-killed frame, and of relaying directives about the necessity of
killing the Tutsi people as well as instructions on how to do it”).
[FN205]. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
[FN206]. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 36 (discussing rape during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia);
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Thomas & Ralph, supra note 166 (discussing the prevalence of rape in war).
[FN207]. See Shattered Lives, supra note 1, at 19.
[FN208]. See, e.g., Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 32 (1975) (contending that
sexual violence has been thought to evidence the males' inability to protect their women).
[FN209]. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
[FN210]. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
[FN211]. Notably, greater reparations for victims may also be attractive. The ICTR, however, is a criminal
tribunal and does not award reparations to victims.
[FN212]. ICTR Statute, supra note 172, art. 23(1).
[FN213]. Id.
[FN214]. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have adopted group defamation statutes. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 53-57 (West 1994); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 272, §98(c) (West 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann. §609.765
(West 1987).
[FN215]. See supra Part II.C.2.
[FN216]. Thomas & Ralph, supra note 166, at 84.
[FN217]. See supra Part II.C.2.
[FN218]. While Akayesu established that sexual violence constitutes genocide, I use the two terms separately
here to demonstrate that simple gender-based violence does not fall within the definition of genocide.
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